Role of local, foreign actors in the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union

What you need to know:

Two days later across the Zanzibar Channel the two heads of state signed the Articles of Union, binding the states together in a political merger.

On April 20, 1964 the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was agreed upon in principal by Abeid Karume and Julius Nyerere in a closed door meeting in Dar es Salaam attended by only a small handful of high-level ministers.

Two days later across the Zanzibar Channel the two heads of state signed the Articles of Union, binding the states together in a political merger.

The question that historians and other commentators are still trying to straighten out fifty years later is why, exactly? The standard reply for years has been that the Union was a shining example of the ideals of Pan-Africanism and served as the model which proved that there could be political unity between African nations. However, in 1989 author and activist Amrit Wilson came out with the provocative thesis that the Union was not an African initiative, but was engineered and orchestrated by the Americans and British in order to stop the spread of communism in eastern Africa.

In her view, the United Republic of Tanzania was an American and British creation through the means of manipulation and subterfuge. This interpretation seemed feasible in light of the revelations about the CIA’s involvement in the Congo just prior to the Zanzibar Revolution that demonstrated the obvious lengths Americans were willing to go in order to engender regime change in Africa. In fact the debate over the role of foreigners in engineering the Union has been discussed by prominent academics Issa Shivji and Haroub Othman, writer Godfrey Mwakikagile, as well as a host of commentators in the Tanzanian media and the East African blogosphere.

A close reading of released American National Security files, CIA documents and interviews with the Tanganyikan Attorney General who drafted the Articles of Union, reveals that while the Americans were initially very pleased with the outcome of the Union—because they thought it would help minimise the influence of the “radical elements” in the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and stem the spread of communism in the region—this was not an American or British initiated plan forced upon East African leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that the Americans were largely in the dark and in fact very frustrated by their lack of influence on the situation with regional leaders.

The idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar was clearly an African one, an idea which had its own long and complicated history stretching back to the 1940s well before Anglo-American concerns over the Zanzibar Revolution.

The actualisation of the union agreement in April of 1964, however, was principally the responsibility of two individuals, Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume, and was built out of both their longtime interests and desires as well as their complex concerns over the evolving situation in the early months of 1964. Therefore the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar served as a confluence of interests. It helped meet the needs of the principle African leaders involved and was also an outcome that the Americans were temporarily pleased with as they thought it would be beneficial to their own geopolitical interests.

However, neither the Americans nor the British were the prime movers or significant shapers of this plan. Instead, the Union was conceived by Africans and largely fashioned by Nyerere and Karume’s key advisers, Tanganyikan Minister of External Affairs Oscar Kambona, and Zanzibari Vice President Abdulla Kassim Hanga. It was the agendas of the two heads of state and the initiative shown by a few of their top ministers that guided the unification process.

The merger was not a plan cooked up by British or American agents and diplomats and then forced upon the leaders of these two nascent postcolonial states.

Zanzibar: East Africa’s Guinea?

Much has been said about the American and British concerns that post-revolutionary Zanzibar would become “an African Cuba,” serving as a bridgehead for the spread of communism into the African continent.

Certainly in the hours immediately following the Revolution this had already developed into a principal concern of American diplomats in East Africa such as the American Ambassador to Tanganyika, William Leonhart, who along with the Western media would repeatedly use this phrase over the next several months. (Somewhat ironically, however, the first use of the term may have been introduced by President Nyerere himself who suggested in a conversation with Leonhart on the night of the Revolution that the former Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)-led government was “far more likely to produce an ‘east African Cuba,’” than any government led by Abeid Karume.)

Nonetheless, the American concern was very real as seen in the statement put out the day after the Revolution by the US State Department’s Director of Intelligence and Research entitled, “The Communist Spectre Looms in Zanzibar.” The central concern from the start was to try and distinguish who in the new revolutionary government was a “moderate” or a “genuinely African nationalist,” and who was a communist-inspired radical.

This was in line with an emerging belief in the American government that all true African nationalists were by definition non-aligned because they wanted their nations to be sovereign and not dependent on any other non-African state—whether capitalist or communist in orientation. Despite this oversimplified view, American policy since the Kennedy years had been to show goodwill to any African nationalists who favoured a non-aligned foreign policy, because this was deemed the most realistic and safest play in Cold War geo-politics

From the start the Americans believed that Abdulrahman Babu was the most dangerous and potentially subversive member in the new Zanzibar government, the Revolutionary Council (RC). They believed he was a committed “communist, Chinese variety” who was loyal to Beijing. In fact, they felt certain the Chinese had supported Babu in the past and would back his bid to take control of the government if the opportunity arose. Other leaders initially seen as communist threats included Abdulla Kassim Hanga, who was believed to be Soviet-trained but whose primary orientation was towards African nationalism; and finally the Americans believed (incorrectly through bad MI-5 information) that self-styled Field Marshall John Okello—the military commander of the insurrection—and his armed thugs were all Cuban-trained. Towards the other end of the spectrum was Karume who was credited as being a “genuine African nationalist” and was clearly seen as the most popular politician in the islands and therefore deserving of Western support, even if he was viewed as “ignorant and inept.” Just three days after the Revolution the US State Department was already concerned that no “concrete efforts” were being pursued by East African governments or the United Kingdom to keep Zanzibar from being drawn into the communist camp.

Over the coming weeks the Americans began contemplating a myriad of different plans for influencing the situation. All of these various strategies were discussed via a flurry of telegrammes and face to face meetings between American diplomats and their British counterparts.

Few, however, were ever implemented—to the great frustration of a number of American and British officials. Already by 17 January the CIA was reporting that they believed a “power struggle seem[ed] likely between African nationalist and pro-communist elements” in the Revolutionary Council. William Leonhart thought the first step in helping shore up support for Karume and the moderates would be to give American diplomatic recognition to the Revolutionary Council. The ambassador believed that this would give substance to the new government’s profession of non-alignment, help prove America’s friendly disposition towards the regime, and bolster the “African nationalist” character of the Revolutionary Council.

But this early plan was foiled because the British were balking on the issue of recognition until they felt the situation became more settled. Their inaction tied American hands because US policy since the Eisenhower administration was that America would let Britain take the lead when it came to issues in their former African colonies. Thus they would not recognise the new government until the British did so first. This entangling policy of relying on the British would continue to muddle the Anglo-American response to the Zanzibar situation in the following weeks.

A new East African crisis, however, would momentarily draw Anglo-American attention away from the events in Zanzibar. Between January 19 and 24 army battalions in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya all mutinied over issues of pay. To the dismay and shame of Nyerere, Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote and Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, all three had to ask their former colonial masters to send military assistance to help restore order in their countries. The British military intervention in these East African states did more than just distract the Americans and British from the developments in Zanzibar, it also provided the inspiration for a new course of action across the Zanzibar Channel. The use of British soldiers to pacify the situations on the mainland prompted Leonhart to wonder if a precedent had now been made for British intervention in Zanzibar.

Recognizing that British warships were already in the vicinity and that the new mood in the region might now be more favourable to British military action, Leonhart recommended that the East African leaders persuade Karume to request British assistance in disarming some of the gun-slinging bands roaming Zanzibar’s alleyways and remove any undesirable individuals that Karume might want gone. By this time a couple of hundred Tanganyikan police officers had already been requested by Karume to restore order in the islands, and the idea was that the Brits would not have to land troops, but just show sufficient force off Zanzibari shores to allow the Tanganyikans to collect arms under the shadows of British warships. One interesting aspect of this plan was to try and reach Karume through Jomo Kenyatta, whom they viewed as the best channel to contact Karume, and get him to ask the British to intervene. Indeed, over the next three months numerous British and American diplomats saw Kenyatta as the key to fixing the Zanzibar conundrum.

It was thought that Kenyatta would be more receptive to doing this favour for the Western powers and that, according to Leonhart, Nyerere was seen as having too much “on his plate,” and was too indulgent of Babu. Upon receiving Leonhart’s message, American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and Under Secretary of State, George Ball, became greatly concerned about the situation and were “anxious to compare notes with the British,” and consult the highest levels of the British government to see what their response was to such a plan. They made clear that the US would let the British take the lead, that they “would not provide any military support,” but that they were assessing non-military forms of assistance. In response, the British were willing to approach Karume and offer military assistance, but made it clear that they would only go in on one of two conditions: that Karume made his request for assistance in writing, or that they had solid evidence that British lives were in danger.

But by February 1, it was clear that neither of these two conditions existed and that the plan could not be implemented. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the British High Commissioner to Zanzibar, Timothy Crosthwait, felt he had no leverage with Karume and that it would be difficult to even find a way to approach Karume on such a topic. Even if he had broken through to Karume, British intervention was probably the last thing Karume wanted to see due to his fears of a Western-led counter-revolution. British and American discussions of intervention were soon redirected to the more immediate crisis of what to do over the impending exile of their diplomatic staffs owing to their continued delay of granting political recognition of the new government in Zanzibar.

Tensions were only cooled towards the end of February after the British finally decided to grant recognition. The Americans followed immediately afterwards that same day. To American minds, however, British dithering cost them a certain amount of favour and creditability because their recognition came a full month after the Cubans, and several weeks after the Soviets, Chinese and several other socialist countries. But at least the belated recognition enabled both diplomatic missions to be allowed to return to the islands and reopen their consulates.

By early March, though, American Secretary of State Rusk was growing impatient with waiting to hear what the British “action plan” was to stop the Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union spread of communism. Rusk was considering plans for educational and economic aid, but he wanted to gather together the opinions of all American diplomats in the region to come up with talking points to send over to the UK Foreign Office.

The first item for consideration was to find a way to eliminate the influence they believed Babu held over Karume. Rusk again returned to the idea of approaching East African leaders to explain the dangers of communism to Karume since the British and Americans’ influence on the Zanzibar government was deemed “negligible” and they were in no position to reach Karume. Rusk hoped the other three leaders would be able to talk to Karume without Babu present. Rusk also toyed with the idea of returning the volatile Field Marshall Okello to Zanzibar who had been sidelined by Karume and forced to leave the islands. He now believed Okello to be an opponent of Babu and might serve to “slow down Babu’s” perceived rapid rise to power. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail below, Rusk also suggested one “long-range solution might lie in some form of federation.”

The same day Rusk sent out his talking points memo, British High Commissioner Crosthwait had finally received a meeting with Karume whose “reception was quite cool.” Far from applying any pressure on Karume, Crosthwait was not even able to get Karume to extend an invitation for a routine meeting with the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, who was currently touring East Africa. Karume did not see the point when he felt “he no particular business to discuss” with Sandys. Regardless, Sandys met with Karume two days later, but Leonhart disappointingly noted that only “non-substantive matters were discussed.” Leonhart took the opportunity to meet with Sandys and his British counterpart in Dar es Salaam to brainstorm future plans for Zanzibar. The newly appointed American chargé d’affairs for Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, and William Atwood, the American Ambassador to Kenya, were also present and the group agreed that Anglo-American political and economic leverage in Zanzibar was “slight” and they still believed getting Kenyatta to act was the key to success.

Sandys did talk with Kenyatta during his East Africa trip and encouraged him to meet with Karume, but Mzee was “cool to the idea” and appeared to have no intention of going. When Sandys responded to Rusk’s query over a British action plan, he reiterated that the British would only intervene with an invitation from Karume, and now added the stipulation that all three East African leaders had to give their approval as well.

After his meetings in Zanzibar and Nairobi he knew this was not going to happen anytime soon. Because of the growing conviction that the Americans and British had very little influence with Karume directly, between mid-March and mid-April the most ubiquitous plan that continued to emanate from London and Washington was to encourage Kenyatta to get the other East African leaders to see Babu as a communist and a threat, and then to get them to approach Karume and encourage him to take the necessary steps to force out the left-leaning elements of his government. Again, Nyerere was seen as too “weak” and that Tanganyika was an “unlikely channel” to get to Karume. On the ground in East Africa though, Anglo-American diplomats were coming to believe that this approach was unworkable and would have no effect. In Nairobi, American chargé Laurence Vass made strong appeals to Kenyatta to act, but Kenyatta made no promises and it was felt that he was not actually going to follow through with anything. In Zanzibar,

Crosthwait and Carlucci agreed that even if Kenyatta did make a “strong approach” towards Karume that it would be ineffective. Certainly their own attempts to reach Karume met with no success. Crosswaith complained that he had “no chance” of meeting alone with Karume, and when Carlucci scored a visit with Karume later in April and tried to subtly bring up the issue of “Eastern imperialism,” Karume appears to have shut the conversation down due his unwillingness to listen to American opinion on the topic. Leonhart would receive a similar rebuff in Dar es Salaam. Despite Leonhart’s earlier suggestion to Rusk that the Americans “not make another direct approach [to] Nyerere on Zanzibar but let Kenyatta take the initiative,” he changed his mind after a March 25th Zanzibar cabinet reshuffle which allegedly entrenched pro-communists in all the key ministries prompted him to pluck up the courage to discuss Zanzibar with Nyerere on his next meeting.

Leonhart received a gentle rebuke from Nyerere who blamed America’s lack of influence with Karume on taking too long to recognize his government and told Leonhart that Tanganyika would not intervene on behalf of Americans any more than they had. Since it became clear to Leonhart and Carlucci that none of the East African governments were willing to get involved and attempt to sway Karume, they both began to consider all sorts of alternate scenarios which they shared with the State Department between mid-March and mid-April. Carlucci’s ideas ran the entire gambit from learning to live with Babu and hoping that one day he would see the “value of true non-alignment,” to creating a local incident that would serve as a pretext for intervention. Carlucci also considered a high-impact personal item like giving Karume his own helicopter and pilot. Leonhart’s plans were more diplomatic in nature.

If Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were unwilling to talk to Karume about the perils of communism, maybe Americans could encourage other African leaders such as Sékou Touré and Hastings Banda, or other Commonwealth leaders to create positive relations with Zanzibar. He considered getting other international organizations to send special missions, as well as buying a large amount of cloves from Zanzibar that the Soviets had just reneged on. The State Department liked the idea of encouraging allies to make a presence in Zanzibar and in early April began asking a number of American Ambassadors in Africa, Europe, Asia and Australia to approach foreign governments on establishing a mission or presence in Zanzibar. The response to this plea to friends seems negligible, but one interesting development came in a meeting with Visiting Indian High Commissioner Tandon who suggested to Carlucci that the Americans intervene directly and that the Indian government, concerned over the treatment of Indians in Zanzibar, might be willing to assist and send a warship. David Bruce, American Ambassador to the UK, was the first to respond that this plan was out of the question, pointing out that “overt American intervention was not feasible.” This was quickly followed by a message from Tandon’s superiors in Delhi distancing the government of India from Tandon’s plan and confirming there would be no naval support from India. By mid-April all American hope in East African leaders reversing the course of events in Zanzibar had “vanished” and the thought of a Karume-invited British-led military intervention was still seen as out of the question.