The compact is done and dusted; now comes the harder part

Tanzania's government and its private sector have put their names to a new compact, presented at State House this week as part of the instruments guiding implementation of Dira 2050.

As one of the experts who contributed to drafting that Vision, I read the document with a mixture of genuine encouragement and professional caution, both of which I want to share candidly with readers who allocate capital into this market.

The compact itself is well constructed. It names specific responsibilities. Government commits to macroeconomic stability, an improved investment climate, infrastructure delivery, human capital investment and formal dialogue with the private sector.

Business commits to increased investment, decent job creation, industrial leadership and ethical conduct. On paper, this closes a gap that has troubled Tanzania's development framework for years, the absence of a shared, mutual accountability document between the state and the businesses it depends on to deliver growth.

That said, declarations of shared responsibility are not new to Tanzania, or to the region. What has been missing, consistently, is not ambition. It is measurement. A compact becomes a credible policy instrument, rather than ceremonial paper, when it specifies who tracks compliance, on what timeline, and what happens when either side falls short.

Dira 2050 itself sets an ambitious course: upper middle-income status, nine priority sectors, institutional modernisation, and a stated ten percent growth trajectory into the next decade.

The private sector compact should be the mechanism that operationalises those targets into something investors and citizens alike can audit, quarter by quarter, rather than a document revisited only at the next high-level forum. Whether it will function that way depends entirely on an implementation architecture that has not yet been made public, and that gap between announcement and mechanism is where I have learned, across a decade advising both governments and investors in this region, to look first.

Here the timing of another release this week is instructive. TISEZA's Q1 2026 Investment Bulletin recorded $1.14 billion in registered investment for the quarter, with China as the leading source of foreign direct investment into the country's Export Processing Zones and Special Economic Zones.

SEZ turnover reportedly quadrupled year on year to $752 million, and Tanzania signed land agreements with nine companies across four zones, Bagamoyo, Kwala, Nala and Buzwagi, spanning agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, packaging, steel and automotive assembly. Manufacturing alone accounted for more than half the quarter's registered projects.

Read together, these two developments tell an important story about the distance between policy signalling and capital behaviour. Investors are not waiting for compacts. They are already moving in a particular direction: concentrated in SEZs, weighted toward manufacturing, and increasingly anchored by Chinese capital rather than the more diversified investor base Tanzania says it wants to attract.

That concentration is not inherently negative. Chinese investment has been consequential and, in the SEZ data, productive. However, a national investment strategy that depends this heavily on a single source of capital carries a structural risk that a compact focused on domestic accountability does not, by itself, address.

This is where the compact's real value will be tested. If it produces published, sector level targets, if it creates a genuine dispute resolution channel for businesses navigating regulatory friction, and if government reports publicly against its own commitments on infrastructure and investment climate on a fixed schedule, it will have done something previous declarations did not.

Kenya and Rwanda have each experimented with similar public private frameworks in recent years, with mixed results that trace back to the same variable, whether the review mechanism outlived the signing ceremony.

If Tanzania's compact instead becomes another symbolic instrument layered onto Dira 2050 without its own enforcement calendar, the FDI concentration this quarter's data reveals will simply continue its current trajectory, formalised in language but unmanaged in practice.

For sovereign funds, DFIs and multinationals evaluating Tanzania, the signal to watch is not the signing ceremony. It is what gets published next: the metrics, the review cadence, and whether the private sector side of this compact, business associations and chambers, is given any real enforcement standing when government commitments lag.

Tanzania has written an ambitious vision before. What it has rarely done is build the accountability infrastructure to match it. This compact is the opportunity and whether it is used will show up in next year's investment bulletin.

Amne Suedi is the Managing Director of Shikana Investment and Advisory, Honorary Consul of Switzerland in Zanzibar, and Chair of the Switzerland-Tanzania Chamber of Commerce. Views expressed are strictly Amne Suedi’s only.