How China’s smart power strategies are redefining security in the Horn

For 32 solid years, Chinese foreign ministers have, without fail, ensured their first overseas new-year trip is to Africa.

In line with this time-honoured annual tradition Beijing has upheld since 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a four-day, three-nation tour of Eritrea, Kenya and the Indian Ocean island state of Comoros on January 4-8, 2022.

But the trip was not business as usual. It marked a seismic shift in China’s foreign policy in the Horn of Africa – now a new vortex of regional and global geopolitical rivalries.

Wang Yi unveiled China’s plan for a comprehensive response to instability in the region to ensure sustainable security and underpin development.

For decades, Beijing anchored its global diplomacy on soft power. But its African policy has become more assertive, defined by “smart power”, which skilfully combines hard and soft power.

As a more measured, targeted and subtle use of hard power, smart power is defined by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank, as “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions of all levels to expand one’s influence and establish legitimacy of one’s action”.

Traced to the thought of political scientist Joseph Nye in his 2007 report, the concept of smart power is a response to the crises of the 21st Century. Globally, a rising tide of populism and anti-globalisation trends – isolationism, protectionism and trade wars – fuelled political and military tensions between the United States and China.

In the wake of the inauguration of Donald Trump in 2017, his declaration of China as a threat to America and the unfurling of a new American policy of containment towards China, a “New Cold War” has loomed large on the global horizon.

This has forced Beijing to redefine its approach to assert its global leadership, counter misinformation that it is engaging in “debt-trap diplomacy” in Africa and support stability in the Horn. China’s smart power rests on two planks of its soft power. One is the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

Wang Yi led the FOCAC 8th Ministerial Conference in Dakar Senegal in November 2021– and also made a quick stop in Ethiopia.

Wang’s return to Africa on January 4, 2022 also sought to promote implementation of the outcomes of the FOCAC Conference, Sino-Africa’s development blueprint for 2021-2024. The other is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Eritrea, the first stop of the Chinese foreign minister’s opening visit this year, joined the Belt and road initiative in November 2021, becoming the 47th African Union member state participating in the multitrillion-dollar infrastructure and connectivity initiative.

China’s smart power, which leans more on soft power than hard power, has six strands. First, it is going for the hearts and minds. In Eritrea, Beijing reiterated its rejection of hegemonism, external interference and unilateral sanctions. It emphasized the need to safeguard sovereignty, mutual respect, independence and national dignity and to build a global order based on justice, fairness and equity. Second, it hoists the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) as a model of stability and development. Bilateral talks with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki on January 5, 2022, revealed China’s efforts to share the lessons of the leadership and resilience of the CPP, which has enabled the development and growth of New China.

Long-term stability and regional peace are necessary conditions for economic development.

Third is the development-as-peace model. China’s smart power highlights development as the surest way of breaking the trap of underdevelopment and lifting the bulk of 1.3 billion Africans from poverty. China is shifting emphasis to trade and industrialisation to enable the infrastructure to pay for itself and expand the economy. During the visit, Kenya and China signed six trade agreements and formed a joint working group to tackle tariff and non-trade barriers to increasing trade and reduce imbalances. Fourth is the “Leading from behind” strategy. China has recalibrated the “leading from behind” strategy used by America in Libya to deal with conflict in the region.

China has entered a strategic relationship with Eritrea, enabling it to tap into Asmara’s position as the most strategic power in the Horn region; it is involved in Somalia and in the war in Ethiopia.

It is also cashing in on its comprehensive strategic partnership with Kenya – one of Africa’s development and diplomatic giants, now in the UN Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council, a pivotal nation in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Chair of the East African Community(EAC).