Political and electoral reforms: Sorting out the money

The country is debating political and electoral reforms, with the focus largely on what critics have argued is the uneven playing field between the long-ruling CCM and opposition parties. Peculiarly, one key aspect of politics in general and elections in particular does not feature in the debates and conversations: money.

Precisely, the relationship between politics, elections, and money.

In one of the sessions debating the proposed reforms, United Democratic Party (UDP) chairperson John Cheyo, equated contemporary elections with auctions, saying that the party or candidate with the most money is more likely to win the election than a party or candidate with little or no money.

To be sure, money and elections have always been intertwined, dating back to the days of the Ancient Greeks, when participation in elections was linked to an individual’s wealth. It was the same with colonial Tanganyika. Money is the single thing that is constant in all forms of elections, regardless of whether a country is regarded as a democracy or not.

It is no wonder that some scholars have described money as “the mother’s milk of politics.”

Studies have shown that money (or lack of it) threatens the stability and vitality of democracies around the world. That so much money is pumped into the body politic during elections to the extent that the outcome of such elections reflects the will of the few and not the majority of the electorate.

Since the return of multipartism in 1992, with each passing election, there have been countless newspaper headlines, surveys and studies that point to mind-boggling sums of money from sketchy sources changing hands.

Increased chances of winning for a particular political party or candidate turn their party primaries into auctions, where violence and cat-and-mouse games between law enforcers and candidates or their agents are commonplace.

In 2010, after decades of campaigning, the country enacted the Election Expenses Act, aimed at addressing what was termed the excessive use of money during elections. It is deeply flawed legislation that has failed to work, but strangely, no one has paid attention to include it in the package of political and electoral reforms debated.

Part 0f this failure was by design.

It is based on faulty foundations. The Registrar of political parties-a partisan institution of state in the current legal and political set up-is the administrator of the law dealing with election expenses. This institution does not have a countrywide network nor financial experts to ascertain the information provided by candidates to political parties.

The Registrar and political parties are protected under confidentiality clauses. The election expenses information submitted by political parties cannot be disclosed or scrutinised by the wider public, which defeats transparency purposes. These clauses shield political parties and candidates from being held accountable because no one knows the exact amount political parties or candidates spend during elections or the sources of such funds. It is a matter of guesswork.

Political parties have inherently weak internal systems, with little or non-existent countrywide networks barring one or two political parties. Even with such reality, the legislation places too much responsibility on political parties by allowing them to police themselves, especially regarding the financial disclosure statements of their candidates. Political parties do not have financial experts or the means to audit the information provided by the candidates.

Political parties and their candidates are allowed to exceed the maximum spending limits set by the minister responsible for elections under what is referred to as “exceptional circumstances” and the reasons for this have to be communicated to the registrar of political parties. However, these “exceptional circumstances” are not defined or clarified anywhere. They are vague.

The time given to political parties and candidates to file their election expenses paperwork is unnecessarily long. There is also the weakness of the severity of sanctions placed on political parties and candidates who violate the expense limits set by law.

The other part is politics.

No one is willing to look too closely into the sources of funds bankrolling election campaigns of political parties.

The playing field will continue to be skewed in favour of certain political parties or candidates regardless of whether the body that runs elections is independent or not if the grease that makes these elections possible is suspect.

The reforms will be incomplete if the voters are left to ‘vote with the shilling’.

Mwakibete is a social-political commentator and analyst based in Dar es Salaam