Russia's lifelong romance with Africa

The recent Wagner-initiated uprising in Russia has raised many eyebrows in African capitals. It should come as no surprise that leaders across the continent are wondering whether this is going to water down Moscow’s engagement with Africa. The short answer is no, and here is why.

The renewed dalliance between Russia and Africa since the mid-2010s has been widely yet wrongly branded as the purely “Russian comeback”.

While Moscow has indeed doubled down on its efforts to reconnect, the interest has been mutual. A need for diplomatic alternatives has been repeatedly voiced in both public and private settings as the countries on the continent felt cornered for the choices they made.

 In 2017, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, a long-time ally of the West who fell out of grace over his diehard stance on political opposition in his own country, lamented the Western countries’ inability “to have a just and balanced attitude to the countries of the East that are growing in capability and getting millions of peoples out of poverty”.

Other concerns were repeatedly raised over the lack of progress made on the peacekeeping front across West Africa, where France was failing to shield civilians from jihadists and terrorists in the Sahel.

The drive to wipe out its own problems without having to kowtow to whoever came to the rescue meant that Africa could no longer bank on a limited range of partners, both politically and economically, seeking instead to diversify its pool of available contacts to work with.

Africa was ready for a new page in its relations with a country like Russia, and the latter was happy to step in.

To deny that in the early 2020s Russia’s reputation in Africa as a security provider was to a large extent built by PMC Wagner is to ignore the cold facts.

In Mali, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso the company was able to carve out a well-deserved image of a reliable partner in the eyes of the leadership and the population alike.

However, Moscow’s pivot to Africa did not hinge on Wagner alone; instead, it has been an all-encompassing drive gradually gaining momentum.

The first Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in October 2019 saw high-level delegates from 40 countries and the signing of over 50 agreements. Securitywise, military supplies to Algeria, Angola, Egypt and Sudan made Moscow one of the leading arms exporters to the African continent.

 Major projects (re)launched and run by the Russian state corporations in 2019-2023, from Rosatom’s nuclear research in Rwanda and Zambia, construction of a power plant in Egypt, to Roscosmos' assistance in the space programs of Angola and Zimbabwe have served as a clear indication that Moscow is interested in more than just a short-term fling and is eying solid relationships instead.

 To quote from Sergey Diaghilev, a famous 20th century Russian philanthropist and a friend of Picasso’s, ‘you don’t joke with the Russians – you marry them’.

Increasingly loud voices in favor of elevating Africa’s priority in Russia's foreign policy have been heard for a long time.

This is not a new development caused by sanctions pressure on Russia. The evolution has been gradual and natural: in fact, it is obvious from the strategic documents of Russia's foreign policy since 1993, which is when the first Russian Foreign Policy Concept was released.

However, it would be dangerously misleading to say that Russia-Africa relations have been on the upswing since independent Russia came into being.

If one is to look at these relations after the demise of the Soviet Union, the first decades left much to be desired: in 1992, Russia closed nine embassies and four consulates across the continent.

 Most offices of the so-called “Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts (SSOD)” and cultural centers in African countries were no longer in operation. Besides, up until 2006, not a single Russian leader had ever visited the continent.

And yet the seemingly star-crossed romance survived and even started blossoming. As early as the second half of the 1990s, Russia's multipolar vision of the world order was first presented, only to be later enshrined in every official document on Russia's foreign policy.

Among other things, it suggested that during the first five years of the 21st century, Russia's Africa policy would be an integral part of its overarching vision, aimed at ensuring its national interests in Africa, with due consideration to the needs and wants of the individual countries of the continent.

For Moscow to implement its Africa policy, the successive Concepts of Russia's foreign policy since 1993 envisaged developing political ties through parliaments and the executive branch. That also meant promoting direct cooperation between Russian regions and African states with the assistance and supervision of the foreign ministry.

Engaging with Africa was supposed to start within the UN, then move to the level of the African Union, next to subregional organizations and all the way down to individual states interested in potential cooperation, a paradigm that found itself slowly taking shape back in the early 2000s.

Today, as the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit seems like distant past and the media space is electrified before the rolling thunder of the upcoming new Summit, the time is right to gauge how profound the shift in the vision of the Russian-African ties has been so far.

The idea of a match for life certainly sits well with the vision of the international system presented in the 2023 edition of Russia’s Concept of Foreign Policy. Unlike many of its predecessors, which would, as a rule, follow a change of guard at the helm of the country, this policy document is first and foremost a response to the political earthquakes transforming the entire world.

The key innovation regarding Africa is indeed the fact that geographically, the region has moved up to a record fourth place in Russia's foreign policy priorities. According to the new edition, Moscow "stands in solidarity" with Africa in the desire for a "fairer multipolar world" and the elimination of "sophisticated neo-colonial practices", with summitry being one of the instruments for achieving such solidarity.

There is no guarantee embedded inside the concept, however, that would ensure a strong and unbreakable intercontinental relationship between Russia and Africa in the very near future. Much needs to be worked out from scratch rather than simply continuing to proclaim the need to back integration, trade and economy in Africa, without even mentioning the specific partner countries.

Arguably, the greatest sin that can ever be committed by a national leader is turning a blind eye to the harsh truths of the geopolitical reality. While the Concept soberingly navigates Russia’s way out of that particular lapse, it represents more than what could have been dubbed Diplomatic Revolution 2.0^, a radical shift in the pattern of alliances and allegiances. Rather, it should be read as a testament to how Moscow views the future of the global system, its own role in it and most importantly, the goals and values underpinning its foreign policies in the years to come. More than anything, this applies to Russia’s relations with its African counterparts.

One uncanny highlight of the Concept is how (unintentionally) well it is aligned with, and to a certain extent inspired by AU’s Agenda 2063.

 First, the document proclaims the UN’s coordinating role in the global system as a sane and peaceful alternative to neocolonialist practices and unipolar ambitions, which is in sync with Africa’s urge to become a resilient and influential global player and partner by the second half of the century.

It also underscores Russia’s willingness to work with pan-African structures such as Afreximbank, AfCFTA and various RECs in a sign of growing understanding of the importance of regional and continental integration for an economically advanced and politically united Africa as per Aspirations 1 and 2. 

Second, a special focus on “a peaceful and secure Africa” is as relevant as ever. With bloody wars everywhere on the continent having subsided into low-intensity conflicts that unleash violence on civilians and set refugees in Brownian motion across the continent, bolstering national sovereignty to ensure resilience against such threats is becoming an uphill battle and a number one priority for African countries.

But a strong, effective state prides itself on more than just the absence of conflict. Instead, it is capable of ensuring food and energy security for its citizens, as aptly outlined in the Concept, providing them with adequate education and healthcare. Its toolbox for conflict management contains preventive diplomacy and military-technical cooperation with international partners, wherever that is applicable, rather than random and reactive moves. Beyond policy documents, Russia’s credo has long consisted in supporting the weaker states, helping to create just the right conditions for them to strengthen governance and build healthy institutions.

Third, the Concept is clear as day on promoting cultural dialogue, religious freedoms and inclusivity in relations with other states, which is further elaborated in Russia’s Humanitarian Policy dated September 2022.

Imagine dealing with the outside world as civilizational entities, or perhaps even whole metaorganisms with multiple cultural genes and identities rather than governments and structures, which are more transient than they might seem.

This philosophy strongly echoes Aspiration 5, calling for an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics, which Russia, viewing itself as a civilization of a kind, duly recognizes and respects.

Finally, the Concept pledges better teamwork between stakeholders. One of the major drawbacks for Russia has been the lack of coordination on the continent. Diplomats, military and paramilitary organizations, corporations all felt like solo wayfarers charging through the African terrain without any help, much less so a fellow traveler to hold the torch for them.

 This is changing now. Russia’s vision suggests that its Africa agenda should be increasingly determined by a whole range of state and non-state actors, including businesses, NGOs and media.

Decision makers are now much better equipped to take calculated risks and conceive strategies as there is an array of think tanks and organizations that specialise in Africa research, such as the Centre for the Middle East and Africa based at MGIMO Institute for International Studies, the Centre for Africa Studies at the Higher School of Economics, the Department of Theory and History of International Relations at Lumumba University, and the Institute for African Studies under the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Related research is carried out in the Russian International Affairs Council and the Valdai Club.

The upward trend in Russia-Africa relations, easily traceable over the past nearly 20 years, is bound to continue regardless of any external factors that may stand in the way.

Contrary to widespread allegations, the major reason for Russia’s commitment is far from a rapacious desire to grab enough minerals and other natural resources for its own development. What Moscow seeks and sees in Africa is not a resource base, but an equal partner in the truly not too distant future.

Mayya Nikolskaya and Vasily Taran, are research fellows, at the Institute for International Studies at MGIMO University (Moscow)