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CIA files unmask confusion over who speaks for Tanzania
Tanzania's Founding Father Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.
What you need to know:
- The declassified CIA document provides a valuable window into a critical juncture in Tanzanian foreign policy as the country navigated the post-Nyerere era
Dar es Salaam. Two years after Mwalimu Julius Nyerere stepped down from the Presidency, his shadow continued to loom large on Tanzania’s foreign policy, especially as far as the liberation movements on the African continent were concerned. Documents declassified by the CIA, titled "Tanzania: Prospects for Change," warned that confusion over who speaks for Tanzania was set to persist until Nyerere retired as party chairman.
“In addition to bringing the party (and himself) into policymaking regarding national liberation groups, the former President reportedly has also taken the lead in formulating official responses to international events,” reads part of the memo sent to Langley Virginia.
The document provides insight into Tanzania's foreign policy transition following Julius Nyerere's departure from the presidency, suggesting a shift towards a more pragmatic approach under President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. The report acknowledges Nyerere's outsized influence on regional affairs, noting his charisma and activism as factors that allowed Tanzania to "play a larger role than the country's economic status or strategic position otherwise would have allowed."
However, it highlighted internal and external challenges that was likely to diminish Tanzania's influence in the years that followed
One key challenge identified in the document is the ongoing influence of Mr Nyerere, even after stepping down as president. The report suggests confusion within the government over foreign policy direction, with Mr Nyerere potentially undermining Mr Mwinyi's efforts to establish his own leadership on the regional stage.
Additionally, the rise of other prominent figures like Zambian President Kaunda and Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe further complicated Tanzania's ability to maintain its previous level of influence.
“Nyerere's departure from regional organisations has allowed Zambian President Kaunda, the new Frontline States Chairman, Zimbabwean President and Nonaligned Movement Chairman Mugabe, and Kenyan President Moi to take over Nyerere's role as pre-eminent regional statesman,” reads part of the CIA document that The Citizen has obtained.
The document also sheds light on the limitations of Tanzania's military capabilities. Years of economic hardship had resulted in "low morale, drastic budget cuts, lack of training and fuel, and inoperable equipment." This, they say had significantly reduced Tanzania's ability to project military power in the region, as evidenced by its struggles to fulfil previous commitments in Uganda and Mozambique.
“Dar es Salaam will find it more difficult to back up strident rhetoric with military force as it did in Uganda (1978-81) and in Seychelles (1982-84). Low morale, drastic budget cuts, lack of training and fuel, and inoperable equipment have reduced the military's ability to deploy and maintain forces outside Tanzanian borders,” reads the report. It further stated: Dar es Salaam will be hard pressed to increase its training commitments to Mozambique and is unlikely to make good-unless someone else helps pay for it-on its pledges of military support to Angola and Uganda
The report predicts a shift in Tanzania's foreign policy under Mwinyi, with a focus on regional cooperation and economic ties. Mr Mwinyi's efforts to mend relations with Kenya and Zaire’s (now DRC) Mobutu, previously strained under Nyerere, are seen as an example of this new approach.
”We believe Mwinyi will stress greater regional trade and military cooperation and will avoid the confrontational posturing of the past. Mwinyi has already begun cooperating more closely with Kenya; he made a successful state visit in mid-1986 that involved restoration of economic links.”
However, the report also acknowledges inconsistencies in Tanzania's foreign policy, particularly regarding support for liberation movements in South Africa.
While Mwinyi sought to improve relations with some regional leaders, Nyerere reportedly continued advocacy for increased support for rebel groups opposed to the South African Apartheid government under PW Botha and later Fredrick De Klerk.
This in their view created a potential conflict between Mwinyi's conciliatory approach and Nyerere's more interventionist stance.
“Assistance and safe-haven to South-West Africa People's Organization (Swapo), ANC, and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) liberation fighters will continue at current or increasing levels, especially if ANC headquarters are shifted to Dar es Salaam, despite increasing acknowledgment of Tanzania's vulnerability to a South African attack,” reads the memo titled ‘Tanzania: Prospects for change.” The declassified CIA document provides a valuable window into a critical juncture in Tanzanian foreign policy as the country navigated the post-Nyerere era.
President Mwinyi faced the challenge of balancing a pragmatic approach to regional cooperation as opposed to the legacy of his predecessor's activism.
