Amnesty International documented the use of recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE by the RSF, including in Darfur and raised concerns about how such equipment entered a conflict setting where restrictions apply.
Africa’s natural resources have returned to the centre of global competition, not only because of oil and diamonds, but because gold and critical minerals now sit inside modern finance, electronics, energy systems and defence supply chains.
In this environment, the framing is a many-actor contest involving states, private firms, traders, armed networks and logistics hubs, where the biggest advantage often comes from speed, leverage and weak oversight at the source.
One of the Gulf States in particular matters in this story because it is among the world’s most powerful commodity gateways. It is a legitimate global marketplace, but it is also repeatedly referenced in research on supply chain opacity and illicit trade risks.
A SwissAid study published in 2024 estimated that at least 435 tonnes of gold were smuggled out of Africa in 2022, worth roughly $31 billion and it highlighted the role of this particular state as a key destination for undeclared gold flows.
This is reinforced by technical analysis used in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative discussions on illicit gold flows, which points to “mirror trade gaps” and chronic under reporting in parts of the gold trade ecosystem.
The evidence supports that when large volumes of high value commodities move through complex systems, weak verification at the mining and export stages can be amplified downstream.
The OECD has also warned that bulk trade in raw gold concentrates, especially via maritime shipping, carries high risks of mis-invoicing, blending and weak traceability, which can channel value away from producing countries.
Sudan illustrates how conflict dramatically intensifies these risks. Since April 2023, Sudan’s war has created a contested environment where supply networks, financing channels and illicit extraction incentives can expand.
Amnesty International documented the use of recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE by the RSF, including in Darfur and raised concerns about how such equipment entered a conflict setting where restrictions apply.
Amnesty later reported evidence involving advanced weaponry linked to UAE import pathways, again underscoring how conflict zones attract and absorb external supply flows.
The most takeaway is to recognise a recurring pattern across wars: when authority fragments, oversight collapses and armed actors gain autonomy, external supply chains and war economies become harder to contain.
Beyond Sudan, at least six additional cases show how natural resources can become geopolitical leverage when institutions cannot fully control extraction, certification and export.
In eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN has documented how armed groups have used mineral taxation to sustain operations.
A UN Security Council related document described the AFC M23 generating large monthly revenues from coltan taxation in Rubaya, demonstrating how global mineral demand can intersect with armed control.
In the Central African Republic, diamonds remain a key example of how conflict economies survive through shadow purchasing networks. An IPIS report noted findings linked to the UN panel, including purchasing in rebel held areas that can provide sustainable financial support to armed structures even when formal controls exist.
In Somalia, the charcoal trade demonstrates how a single commodity can finance violent actors when enforcement is weak. UN Security Council Resolution 2036 imposed a ban on the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia and required measures to prevent exports, explicitly treating the trade as a security and financing concern.
In Libya, governance fragmentation has enabled large scale illicit markets built around subsidised systems. The Sentry’s “Inside Job” report describes fuel smuggling as a major national crisis costing Libya about $6.7 billion in 2024, showing how public resources can be diverted through capture of logistics and state institutions.
In Niger, uranium has become a flashpoint in a wider contest over sovereignty and external dependence. Orano publicly opposed Niger’s nationalisation plans for the Somair joint venture, showing how strategic minerals quickly move from commercial partnership into geopolitical confrontation during political rupture.
In the Sahel, illicit gold trafficking has increasingly been treated as an organised crime and governance challenge. UNODC’s analysis on gold trafficking in the Sahel links illicit flows to criminal networks and institutional weaknesses, illustrating how gold can become both a store of value and a financing mechanism in fragile settings.
Across these cases, the mechanism is vacuum economics. When institutions cannot or choose not to regulate mining sites, confirm ownership, audit production and enforce border controls, resources leak into shadow systems.
External actors can benefit because global markets reward supply and weak governance lowers friction for those willing to exploit loopholes.
Jasper Kwayu is a communications strategist based in Dar es Salaam. [email protected]
