Islamist groups fuel anarchy in Bangladesh under Yunus
Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh, or HIB, grabbed public attention in 2013, having turned out more than a half million activists onto the streets of Dhaka to effectively seize the capital city.
The group had sprung from thousands of unregulated Qawmi madrasas across the country and demanded the government meet a 13-point manifesto, including the enactment of an anti-blasphemy law with provision for the death penalty, the cancellation of the national women’s development policy, a ban on constructing sculptures in public places, as well as on men and women mixing in public, and the demand to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims, among other issues.
HIB has retained its stronghold through its network of hundreds and thousands of madrasas, teaching orthodox Islam, spread all over the country.
Although HIB does not have any explicit political agenda to take power, its activists hold extremely radical attitudes and have a tendency to hold violent protests. It seeks to use its street muscle to change Bangladesh’s traditional secular culture and politics through the imposition of what it believes are proper Islamic ways.
These Islamic beliefs that the Hefazat wishes to uphold range from declaring the reformist Ahmadiyas as “non-Muslims”, a ban on mixing of men and women in public, enactment of an anti-blasphemy law with provision for the death penalty to cancellation of the country’s women development policy.
In fact Hefazat-e-Islam, which translates to ‘Protectors of Islam’, was formed in 2010 to oppose the Sheikh Hasina government’s Women’s development policy which promised equal rights to property for women.
Despite its illiberalism, HIB is socially accepted because madrassas offer free boarding to hundreds of students, cater to Islamic rituals and services, and receive a significant part of zakat, charity payments that form an essential pillar of Islam.
Groups under the Hefazat banner played a key role in the mass demonstrations in 1994 which forced the feminist writer Taslima Nasreen to seek asylum in Sweden. In essence, the group has established itself as an authority over the image of Islam in highly conservative Bangladeshi society.
HIB Islamists have staked claim to the nation’s polity once again. Hefazat has become more vocal and active following the August 2024 revolution in Bangladesh. The political vacuum created by the ousting of Sheikh Hasina has allowed Islamist groups, including Hefazat-e-Islam, to gain more influence and prominence.
The ideological divide between secular and Islamist factions has resurfaced, and Hefazat has been actively participating in the post-revolution political landscape.Leader of the caretaker government Muhammad Yunus has adopted the approach of placate hardliners by inducting the extremist group’s deputy chief Prof. A.F.M. Khalid Hossain as Adviser for Religious Affairs in the interim government. HIB’s hardline attitudes are breeding an illiberal authoritarianism, which could eventually fuel extremism.
Following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime in August last year, hardliner Islamists have perpetuated intolerance toward religious minorities in the country, particularly Hindus. The Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh has also experienced targeted violence and persecution.
Since August 2024 the socio-political environment in Bangladesh has become even more conducive for Islamist radicals to propagate and manifest their extremist ideologies, capitalising on the instability and rising intolerance in the country.
Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh Ameer Muhibbullah Babunagari and Secretary General Sajedur Rahman have called for banning the Awami League. In a statement issued on 14 February, Babunagari and Sajedur accused the Awami League of continuously orchestrating sabotage to discredit student leadership and the Islamic public.
Their leaders also alleged that India is still acting like a hostile state and has yet to accept a post-Hasina Bangladesh. With a rising anti-Indian mindset in Bangladesh, the government must craft a careful and informed policy response to HIB. Catering to its demands would deal a further blow to Bangladesh’s relations with India which have been badly impacted by the ouster of the Awami League government.
On February 11, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Dr Shafiqur Rahman held a meeting with Pakistan’s high commissioner to Dhaka, Syed Ahmed Maroof, expressing the desire to strengthen bilateral relations between the two fraternal nations in the future.
In October 2024, hundreds of students in Dhaka participated in a procession allegedly orchestrated by HuT under the banner of “Conscious Teachers and Students.”
The participants carried flags that resembled those of the Islamic State and vocally demanded the establishment of a caliphate in Bangladesh. Such activities highlight the organisation’s capacity to mobilise youth and intellectuals under its ideological framework, presenting a serious challenge to the authority of the State.
On December 10, economist Anu Muhammad expressed concerns in a column that ‘in certain instances, it seems that the government does not exist in the country’. He wrote that such incidents were creating questions on an international level concerning the credibility of the present government.
“In which direction is Bangladesh being led? There are assaults and attacks on baul songs, mazars (shrines) and sculptures. Who are the ones launching these attacks? What is the government doing to stop them?” Muhammad asked.
In the seven tumultuous months since July, the interim government has struggled to deliver stability and every passing day Bangladesh descends into chaos. On February 5, 2025 which could have been a day for Bangladesh’s Muhammad Yunus government to highlight its achievements, instead turned out to be a day that exposed how Bangladesh faces the risk of descending into anarchy.
Activists gathered to pull down Mujibur Rahman’s residence at 32, Dhanmondi in the heart of Dhaka. This building, preserved as a museum, was vandalised on August 5, 2024, within an hour of Hasina flying out.
And then on February 5, 2025, a mob of a few hundred people, armed with bulldozers and hammers, demolished the building in a frenzy and in full view of a contingent of armed forces, television channels and social media ‘live’ videos for over 12 hours. Mujib’s ‘historic residence’ was destroyed with complete knowledge of the law enforcement agencies. The government responded with deafening silence.
The first response from Yunus came at 4 pm the next day on February 6, when he blamed Hasina for being the cause for the vandalism, ostensibly forgetful of the norm that protecting properties and enforcing laws are the government’s duty.
These vandalisms and mob violence were not a period of exception. There are other signs of the rise of the Muslim fundamentalist forces that are bent on erasing things that they find un-Islamic, going by their own interpretation of Islam.
The rising influence of Islamist parties and factions within the country and their control over the state apparatus today under the interim government, has raised concerns regarding its potential impact on social cohesion within Bangladesh.
The situation has been further complicated by incidents like the one on February 24, 2025, in Chattogram, where Bangladesh Air Force personnel opened fire on a mob protesting against the eviction of illegal settlers from government-owned land, resulting in one death and multiple injuries. These events highlight the ongoing tensions and instability in the country.
What’s stopping the Yunus government from acting against religiously motivated mobs is quite evident–its heavy dependence on Jamaat-e-Islami, the biggest Islamic political party in the country, as well as other Islamic parties and organisations.
Meanwhile no relief from undemocratic religious forces comes into sight. On February 12, another music event was cancelled following objections from Hefazat-e-Islam.
