Mineral resource rights in Pakistan and a fight for autonomy

Pakistan’s natural resource management saga has become a cautionary tale of how entrenched centralization continues to erode provincial autonomy, despite constitutional guarantees to the contrary.

Fifteen years after the landmark 18th Amendment promised greater provincial control over natural resources, the same patterns of exploitation persist, most acutely in resource-rich regions like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Sindh, and Balochistan.

The 18th Amendment, passed with great fanfare in 2010, was hailed as a watershed moment for federalism. Through Article 172(3), it enshrined joint ownership of natural resources between the provinces and the federal government. Yet the reality on the ground paints a starkly different picture, one of systematic circumvention and subversion of provincial rights.

Today, the federal government pays lip service to the ideals of autonomy while orchestrating elaborate mechanisms to retain its grip on the nation’s mineral wealth. This contradiction between constitutional promise and political practice has precipitated a governance crisis that threatens both Pakistan’s stability and its economic future.

KP offers a compelling illustration of this troubling dynamic. Endowed with vast deposits of marble, granite, gemstones, chromite, and copper, the province should be flourishing. Instead, its natural wealth is systematically extracted to benefit federal interests, with minimal reinvestment in local infrastructure, education, or healthcare.

Take the marble and gemstone industries, for instance. KP’s Swat Valley is renowned for its high-quality emeralds, yet local communities see little of the profits.

Raw stones are often smuggled or sold at undervalued rates to middlemen, who then export them for massive gains. Similarly, marble quarries in districts like Buner and Mohmand are exploited with little regard for environmental sustainability or community welfare. Roads are damaged by heavy machinery, dust pollution affects respiratory health, and safety standards for workers remain abysmally low.

Chromite mining in areas like Malakand and copper extraction in Dir further underscore the imbalance.

These minerals are extracted in bulk and transported out of the province, often under opaque contractual arrangements. Local governments struggle to track revenues, and royalty payments are either delayed or diluted through bureaucratic red tape. The result is a province rich in resources but poor in outcomes.

In this context, the recently proposed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Bill 2025 represents a sincere and long-overdue effort by the provincial government to reclaim stewardship over its natural endowment. Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur has emphasized that the bill was crafted through robust stakeholder consultation, aiming to ensure transparency, community benefit-sharing, and environmental safeguards.

Yet, federal authorities have launched a coordinated campaign to discredit the legislation, dismissing it as “hasty” and “ill-conceived.” This reaction is not merely administrative; it reflects a deeper unwillingness to relinquish centralized control. The federal government’s resistance to KP’s assertion of its constitutional rights epitomizes the broader pattern of obstruction and exploitation that has long plagued Pakistan’s resource governance.

This federal interference is emblematic of a broader pattern: whenever provinces seek to exercise their constitutional rights, they are met with obstruction, bureaucratic inertia, and outright sabotage from Islamabad. The federal government’s actions reveal a deep-seated reluctance to relinquish the centralized control that has long defined Pakistan’s resource governance.

KP is not alone in this struggle. Across Pakistan similar tensions are playing out.

Sindh faces federal encroachment in the form of unilateral canal construction on the Indus River, most notably the controversial Cholistan Canal. Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah has threatened to use force to halt the project, citing blatant violations of the 1991 Water Accord. The federal response? Dismissive rhetoric and continued construction, with little regard for Sindh’s concerns over water security.

This canal project is part of the Green Pakistan Initiative, which aims to transform the Cholistan Desert into fertile farmland for corporate agriculture, at the expense of Sindh’s already strained water supply.

In 2023, Sindh was allocated 4.645 million acre-feet (MAF) of water but received only 3.560 MAF, while Punjab, the primary beneficiary of these new canals, faced a much smaller shortfall.

The result: over 18 million acres of farmland in Sindh remain uncultivated due to water shortages, with another 12 million acres at risk.

Beyond water, Sindh’s mineral wealth is also subject to exploitative extraction. The Thar Desert in Tharparkar district holds one of the world’s largest lignite coal reserves, estimated to be over 175 billion tons.

While touted as a solution to Pakistan’s energy crisis, the development of Thar coal has largely bypassed local communities. Foreign and federal stakeholders dominate the project, while residents face displacement, environmental degradation, and limited access to the economic benefits.

Similarly, districts like Thatta and Jamshoro are rich in limestone, marble, iron ore, and salt. These resources are extracted and transported out of the province with minimal reinvestment in local infrastructure or employment.

The mining operations often lack transparency, and environmental regulations are weakly enforced, leading to deforestation, soil erosion, and water contamination.

The cumulative effect of these policies is a pattern of resource extraction that enriches federal and corporate interests while impoverishing the very regions that supply the wealth.

Whether it’s water diverted to irrigate deserts or minerals mined without local benefit-sharing, Sindh’s experience reflects a broader crisis of federalism, a system where constitutional rights are routinely ignored in favor of centralized control.

Balochistan presents perhaps the most tragic case in Pakistan’s federal landscape. Despite being endowed with immense mineral wealth, including copper, gold, coal, and rare earth elements, it remains the country’s most impoverished and underdeveloped province.

The disconnect between resource abundance and local deprivation is not accidental; it is the result of decades of extractive policies that prioritize federal and foreign interests over provincial rights and community welfare.

The Reko Diq copper-gold project is emblematic of this imbalance. Located in Chagai district, Reko Diq holds one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper and gold deposits. Yet the project, now revived through a joint venture involving Barrick Gold and the federal government, has largely excluded Baloch stakeholders from meaningful participation.

While billions of dollars are projected in revenue, local communities remain sidelined, with little clarity on how, or if, they will benefit from employment, infrastructure, or environmental protections.

Beyond Reko Diq, coal mining in Balochistan offers another stark example. Districts such as Duki, Harnai, Shahrigh, and Sor Range are rich in coal reserves and serve as key hubs for Pakistan’s energy production.

However, mining operations in these areas are marred by unsafe working conditions, child labor, and frequent accidents. Miners often work without protective gear, and fatalities due to mine collapses are tragically common. Despite generating substantial revenue, these districts lack basic amenities like clean water, electricity, and healthcare.

The Saindak copper-gold project, developed with Chinese investment, further illustrates the pattern of external exploitation. While the project has been operational for years, its benefits have largely bypassed the local population. Revenues are funneled to Islamabad and foreign partners, while Baloch communities continue to suffer from unemployment, displacement, and environmental degradation.

This extractive model has fueled deep resentment and insurgency. Many Baloch view these projects not as development initiatives but as instruments of plunder. The lack of transparency, absence of local consultation, and failure to share benefits have entrenched a sense of alienation and injustice.

Armed groups like the Baloch Liberation Army have emerged in response, targeting infrastructure and foreign personnel involved in resource extraction.

Pakistan’s federal government continues to tighten its grip on provincial resources, undermining the very principles of federalism enshrined in the Constitution. From KP’s mineral wealth to Sindh’s water rights and Balochistan’s vast deposits of copper and coal, the story is the same: extraction without empowerment, development without inclusion.

This centralized model of governance has not only stifled provincial autonomy but also deepened regional disparities and fueled unrest, perpetuating a cycle of alienation, instability, and squandered potential.