Could Covid vaccines be used to demand more aid accountability?

Should Covid-19 vaccines and aid be used as diplomatic carrots to coax more accountability and transparency out of corruption-riddled countries such as South Sudan?

Critics may cry foul at the idea of attaching strings to humanitarian assistance, but an unwillingness to scrutinise the unintended negative consequences of aid has made donors complicit in filling the coffers of corrupt leaders and propping up the bad governance that has contributed to the chronic nature of many humanitarian crises.

It is no coincidence South Sudan’s suffering has been maintained alongside its corruption rankings. In 2013, South Sudan was ranked 173rd out of 175 countries in Transparency International’s Corruptions Perception Index. By 2020, it ranked last – tied with Somalia. South Sudan has been on my mind recently as I hear the calls for a generous response to address the Covid-19 pandemic.

A shipment of some 132,000 vaccines just arrived, and more than $100 million has been given toward the country’s pandemic response. I wonder if these resources will be used as intended, to help the country’s suffering population, or if they too will be fodder for more graft.

A global response is essential. There are both humanitarian and pragmatic reasons for wealthy countries to care about the pandemic’s trajectory well beyond their borders.

But I also wonder if this could present an opportunity to try and test a new approach of managing aid more closely wedded to results.

When I arrived in South Sudan in 2013 as a second-tour US diplomat – two years after the country had achieved independence – two things were readily apparent. The United States had invested significantly in the country’s success, and the return on that investment had been abysmal – both for the United States and the people of South Sudan.

By that time, humanitarian crises and violent clashes were unfolding at a rapid rate, and the government was showing little interest or initiative in turning the situation around.

I couldn’t understand how this country that enjoyed so much international good will had made such little progress toward building a functional state, but what I learned was that international partners had done little to ensure an effective use of aid. That, combined with corruption and the absence of political will, had led to a poor investment.

Time has only worsened this situation in South Sudan. International generosity has continued despite a lack of meaningful improvement in governance or circumstances.

The rich become richer, while the poor stay on donor-funded life support. Covax, the global effort to distribute vaccinations to low income countries, could provide a discrete opportunity to factor accountability mechanisms into distribution decisions, using vaccines as a carrot to reward effective behaviours.

Currently, Covax distribution is focused on spreading allocation across countries evenly. It will supply up to 20 percent of each participating country’s population before any country is able to secure a higher amount through the mechanism.

Instead of focusing strictly on even distribution, Covax could incorporate other factors in prioritisation, such as provision of sound distribution plans and accountable tracking mechanisms to ensure that limited resources provide the most benefit.

Some of the world’s poorest countries have been spared the worst of Covid so far – although data has been difficult to obtain. Still, low tolls and hospitalisations could limit how useful Covid assistance is as leverage. At the same time though, it also makes the use of such assistance as leverage a more humane possibility.

No one wants to punish a population for the transgressions of its government. But in countries where infection, hospitalisation, and infection rates remain low, using vaccine supplies as a tool could be less harmful than doing so with food supply in a hunger crisis.