Oscar Kambona: Hero or villain?

The Minister for Regional Administration, and TANU Secretary General, Mr Oscar Kambona, greets party officials at Kivukoni College before an official meeting in

1966. File Photo

What you need to know:

As Home Affairs minister, Oscar Salathiel Kambona was part and parcel of a group of leaders who set the stage for policies and actions that muzzled the opposition in 1962

Oscar Salathiel Kambona became the Minister for Home Affairs after independence. He was directly involved in silencing the opposition during the Presidential elections in the end of 1962.

The African National Congress of Tanganyika was banned in 1962. The leader of ANC, Zuberi Mtemvu, and his lieutenants had become vocal critics of the new government. Kambona convinced Tanu leadership to ban ANC meetings citing fear of violence.

Tanu and the new government were embarking on an ambitious development plan. Neither the party nor the government was in the mood to tolerate criticism from the opposition.

Kambona was part and parcel of a group of leaders who set the stage for policies and actions that muzzled the opposition during the course of 1962. Many of the directives came from the Ministry of Home Affairs under Kambona.

Tanganyika became a Republic on December 9, 1962. Kambona became one of the most powerful people in Tanganyika with his appointment as the Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs in the new Republic. The Tanganyika government and later the United Republic of Tanzania studied one-party system between 1963 and 1965.

Kambona was involved in the study and setting up of a one-party system. Tanu National Convention of January 1963 voted to approve a motion to adopt one-party system. When asked about the motion, Kambona replied there had been less debate on the matter when compared to other issues such as allowing non-Africans to join the party.

Practical questions

He pointed out that some asked “practical questions” about one-party system during the deliberation and went on to defend one-party system. Kambona argued that a one-party system would create the environment of less secrecy as meetings would be open to the press and the party would become an educational instrument.

Lastly, Kambona asserted that one-party system would mean less chances of factions.

One of Kambona’s first projects as the Minister with two portfolios in 1963 was to rebuild Tanganyika defense forces. New recruits had to be trained, new weapons purchased, and finally, a new intelligence organisation be created. Kambona had his hands on some of the most sensitive projects for the nation in 1963.

New soldiers were recruited and trained, some at home and others were sent abroad. Kambona oversaw an ambitious plan to arm the new army he was building. He also dismantled the old intelligence organisation that was set up by the British after it was discovered that some of the Special Branch agents had reestablish links with former British handlers.

New recruits were identified from Tanu Youth League and trained by the Israelis, British, and by others. These were ambitious projects for the newly appointed Minister. Kambona had to learn on the job.

President’s personal security

Kambona became concerned with the President’s personal security early 1963. He learned about security breaches at the State House and started searching for a way to improve Presidential security.

It was Kambona who approached the Americans with a request for training for a small selected group of men. He coordinated the efforts with Job Lusinde and the Director of Intelligence Emilio Charles Mzena, two old schoolmates from Tabora Boys.

The Americans eventually agreed to provide special training for Presidential security for Peter Bwimbo and others; it was a decision that may have later saved Nyerere and Kawawa during the army mutiny of 1964.

There was no question that Kambona was loyal to the President and determined to do his part to build his nation at the time.

The newly independent Tanganyika was tested in the first four months of 1964. Kambona played a critical role in diffusing a dangerous situation that erupted on January 20, 1964 when the army mutinied. While Nyerere and Kawawa went into hiding under the careful eyes of the head of Presidential security Peter Bwimbo, Kambona and Lusinde were two high government officials who kept the government going.

Kambona eventually managed to convince the soldiers to return to their barracks. The troubles did not fully subside, but it gave Nyerere enough time to call British troops to disarm the army. Kambona’s grip on power and influence peaked during the dark days of the mutiny between January 20 and 27.

He managed to maintain communication with the soldiers and kept them calm. However, suspicions and questions would later emerge about his role in the mutiny. Kambona’s loyalty was questioned for the first time. It was a major blow to Kambona’s morale. The accusations were serious and it took its toll on him.

Nyerere defended Kambona and dismissed suggestions that Kambona had been behind the mutiny. The damage had been done. While he managed to calm down the soldiers, failure to collect intelligence and prevent the mutiny before it took place loomed high.

Zanzibar revolution

The Zanzibar Revolution in January of 1964 and the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar April 1964 were two major events that Kambona played a major role. Kambona has been linked to the Zanzibar revolution of January 1964.

There is some evidence to suggest that he was aware of and may have taken part in the planning of the revolution. There is no doubt that the key organizers of the revolution were Zanzibaris themselves.

Tanu and ASP collaborated closely in the early 1960s. Tanu sent moral and material support to ASP in the elections of 1961 and again in 1963. Zanzibar leaders worked closely with mainland leaders in the course of 1963. Kambona was spotted with Karume at a beach before the latter left on a boat with armed men to return to Zanzibar on the evening of January 11.

The relationship between some leaders from Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued in February and March of 1964 as the situation in Zanzibar deteriorated.

Tanganyika placed their support on Abeid Karume during the power struggle following the revolution. It became increasingly clear that Karume’s position of power was in jeopardy by beginning of April 1964.

Once again, Kambona became the key leader from Tanganyika to work on a project of establishing union with Zanzibar.

Kambona turned to his old roommate Abdullah Kassim Hanga and Twala to convince Karume and later Babu of the idea of a union with Tanganyika. Karume eventually caved in fearing loss of power.

The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was made public on April 22, 1964. Kambona had performed his duties with distinction.

Related story:

Professor Azaria Mbughuni is Chair, History Department, Lane College, US. He can be contacted on: Email - [email protected]; and Twitter - @AzariaTz

Tomorrow: How Kambona mishandled a sensitive Nyerere assignment that sparked a major diplomatic crisis with the US.