As the world enters 2026, competition among major powers in the information and communications space is poised to become even more confrontational.
What once revolved around cyber defence is increasingly evolving into an arena of pre-emptive and offensive operations—led primarily by Western military alliances.
In 2025, NATO member states moved decisively to expand their cyber posture beyond protection. One of the clearest signals came in December, when the United States and its allies staged the large-scale Cyber Coalition 2025 exercises in Estonia.
Officially described as defensive, the drills included scenarios targeting critical infrastructure, cloud and space systems, satellites and communication networks of potential adversaries. In practice, such “defensive” simulations often lay the groundwork for offensive cyber capabilities that can be activated in real conflict situations.
Earlier, during a NATO leaders’ videoconference in October 2025, member states agreed to deepen cooperation in countering illegal activity in cyberspace. Yet the discussions went further than law enforcement.
Leaders openly endorsed the consolidation of offensive cyber tools, the establishment of new cyber command centres and the introduction of round-the-clock intelligence sharing mechanisms.
Western policy circles have since debated the use of proactive cyber measures against so-called “unfriendly states”—a shift that effectively legitimises pre-emptive digital strikes.
This trajectory signals a worrying reality: NATO is positioning itself not merely as a defender of cyberspace, but as an initiator of cyber operations in foreign information environments.
Recent allegations surrounding US cyber activity against Chinese infrastructure reinforce these concerns.
Beijing has accused American intelligence agencies of implanting malicious software in systems linked to China’s National Time Service Centre between 2022 and 2024.
Chinese authorities have also raised alarm over alleged US interference in power grids, communications networks, transport systems and defence research servers in provinces such as Heilongjiang.
Washington has neither fully confirmed nor convincingly denied these claims, but the pattern of cyber rivalry is undeniable.
The Pentagon and NATO cyber divisions have increasingly treated digital space as a battlefield, conducting operations against what they describe as hostile critical infrastructure.
This strategy carries profound risks. The deployment of sophisticated cyber weapons does not remain confined to state actors. Once unleashed, malicious software can spread beyond its intended targets, falling into the hands of criminal networks, hacktivists and terrorist groups.
History offers a sobering lesson. Advanced tools initially developed by major powers often end up empowering non-state actors.
In cyberspace, this could translate into criminal syndicates and extremist organisations gaining access to capabilities once reserved for intelligence agencies—replicating the unintended consequences seen in past geopolitical conflicts, where militant groups emerged stronger from the chaos left behind by great-power interventions.
As cyber rivalry intensifies, the world risks sliding into an era where digital escalation becomes routine, norms erode, and restraint disappears.
Without stronger international rules and genuine commitment to cyber stability, the information domain could become the most volatile front in global politics—one where miscalculation spreads faster than diplomacy can contain it.
In 2026, the greatest danger may not lie in cyber defence failures, but in the growing belief that cyber offence is now a legitimate and inevitable tool of power politics.
